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ABSTRACT
It is often argued that the problems currently facing the World Trade Organi-
zation stem from an important shift in the trade agenda from tariff reduction
to the harmonisation of domestic regulations considered as non tariff barri-
ers. From this perspective, the lack of harmonisation of domestic regulations
severely impairs the capacity of the WTO to fulfil its mission. This article
argues, in contrast, that the underlying problems facing the contemporary
trade agenda are different, and are caused by a lack of differentiation in the
regulatory framework of the WTO. To substantiate this claim, a conception
of transnational mercantilism is derived from recent scholarly revisions of
classical mercantilism. This clarifies a continuity between the external dimen-
sion and the comprehensive pattern of social organisation involved in the
political economy of international trade. This framework is used to appraise
four structures upon which trade policy is predicated: the implementation of
market mechanisms, the embeddedness of trade in state-society relations, the
link between trade and the natural environment, and special and differential
treatment for developing countries.
KEYWORDS
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INTRODUCTION
It is often argued that a ‘new trade agenda’ has emerged in the past few
years. This new trade agenda has shifted from trade liberalisation based
on tariff concessions (a so-called ‘shallow integration’) to ‘deep integra-
tion’, or harmonisation of domestic regulations deemed to have an impact
on trade.1 The article explores the increasingly controversial status of a
global trading order which brings new areas of public life within the am-
bit of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since its inception, the WTO
has appropriated a wide variety of new trade-related issues, including
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intellectual property, investment policy, health and safety regulations, and
industrial standards. Issues such as competition policy, government pro-
curements and environmental regulation are in the pipeline. These in turn,
have prompted protests from a growing array of transnational social move-
ments. Both liberals and critics of the new trade agenda interpreted the
failure of the 1999 WTO Ministerial conference in Seattle to launch a new
round of negotiations as evidence of the difficulties of encroaching upon
crucial domestic policy areas (Dymond and Hart, 2000; Gill, 2000). The
new round of trade negotiations agreed to by the Doha Ministerial confer-
ence in November 2001, the so-called ‘Doha Development Agenda’ (WTO,
2001a), failed to overcome this controversy. Indeed, according to Pascal
Lamy (2001), the European Trade Commissioner, Doha ‘should contribute
crucially to improved governance by expanding considerably the areas of
trade-related matters subject to global rules’. Critics argue, however, that
without the ‘convergences required to replace the WTO’s bid for a corpo-
rate utopia with an international citizen’s agenda that protects the poor
and the planet [. . . ] Doha will be known as a pivotal point in history where
global governance was truly usurped’ (Menotti, 2002: 2).
Advocates of the new trade agenda have tended to assume that broad-
ening the scope of trade policy issues to include harmonisation of domes-
tic regulations requires the penetration of market mechanisms into more
and more areas of social life. Lately, the perspective has been amended in
pragmatic as well as legal terms (e.g. Alvarez, 2002; Dymond and Hart,
2000; Marceau and Trachman, 2002). The route taken by the current re-
vision echoes the discourse on ‘globalisation with a human face’; but as
borne out by the recent difficulties of the WTO, there is a lack of clear
principles and criteria to define ways in which a wider array of domestic
policy issues can have a substantial and disparate impact on international
trade. Thus, the revision fails to explore how the social dimension of the
new trade agenda would limit a fully-fledged harmonisation of the global
trading order. It fails to grasp the unquantifiable and mutually incompat-
ible issues that fall within the scope of the new trade agenda. In other
words, it is not the shift towards deep integration in itself, and the lack
of principles guiding this shift that explain the recent difficulties faced
by the WTO, but rather the content of deep integration and its guiding
principles.
The claim of this paper is that the current difficulties of the WTO reflect
a lack of consensus on the level of differentiation in trade policy required
for a comprehensive global trading order. The argument draws upon the
recent scholarly revision of classical mercantilism.2 This body of literature
provides new means to conceptualise the selective and differentiated role
of the state in trade policy. The value in use of the goods to be exchanged
was a key criterion in the concerns of mercantilist authors for a positive
balance of trade. To translate into the contemporary debate the lessons that
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can be drawn from authors who wrote centuries ago, I introduce the con-
cept of transnational mercantilism. At first sight this might appear to be an
oxymoron. However, identifying mercantilism as transnational brings out
a tension which exists when state practices in the area of non-market issues
are put to the test by those involved in the transnational drive of capitalism.
Following heterodox traditions in global political economy, the concept of
transnational mercantilism privileges socio-historical over structural ex-
planations of the political economy of global trade.3 Such an understanding
gives substance to the contemporary debate on the rationale for a socially
defined appraisal of trade policy in a capitalist environment. It also gives
additional purchase to the understanding of a global trading order as one
undermined by the claims of subordinate social interests, as opposed to an
explanation which relies merely on the lack of American leadership, or the
assumed threats of unilateralism and regionalism.
The argument is organised as follows. The first part develops a theo-
retical framework that specifies the controversial nature of the WTO in a
comprehensively defined global trading order. It posits the largely misun-
derstood relevance of classical mercantilist authors to generate a critical
analysis of the new trade agenda. The second part examines four areas
of controversy for a comprehensive, yet differentiated trade agenda. It
analyses significant limits to the transnationalisation of the global trading
order. It is divided into four sections: the implementation of market mech-
anisms (freer non-discriminatory trade); the embeddedness of trade into
state-society relations (e.g. employment, labour standards, public utilities);
into nature (e.g. trade in primary commodities, agriculture, environmental
concerns); and into the spatio-temporal structure of capitalism (e.g. spe-
cial and differential treatment for development concerns). The conclusion
summarises the argument and projects implications for future research.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSNATIONAL
MERCANTILISM
Both pragmatic and legal analyses have recently undermined the assump-
tion that the major problems of the WTO rest on the weaknesses of a rule-
based market harmonisation. In the aftermath of the ‘Battle of Seattle’,
trade practitioners have become more inclined to endorse the idea that
the new trade agenda can encompass differences in economic regulation
having little to do with the need for rent-seeking protection against im-
ports. According to Dymond and Hart (2000: 30), ‘while there may be
a solid economic case for liberalisation through national treatment prin-
ciples reinforced by harmonisation, the effect is to bring into question
the deep social and historical roots which underpin systems of national
or sub-national regulation and thus raise profound issues of national
self-determination’. While the Doha agenda embodies potential flexibility
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on a range of issues, the following meeting in Cancun, 2003, notoriously
failed to give substance to it.
Legal scholars have criticised the most libertarian version of a ‘consti-
tutional’ argument in defence of an extended market-based trade agenda.
This view calls for a broader scope of the GATT/WTO legal order, seeing it
as rooted in classical constitutional law establishing property and contrac-
tual rights as core natural rights, and therefore contributing to limit state
capacities to enhance the economic freedom of individuals (Petersmann,
1991, 2003). Howse (2002: 105) highlights the implications of this line of
argument: ‘If free trade is recast in terms of [constitutional] rights, it must
obviously be integrated or balanced somehow with other human rights’.
There is indeed no reason why the trading system itself should have the
legitimacy to strike the balance. Other institutions more closely related to
positive constitutional rights, such as the United Nations organs in charge
of international human rights law or the domestic institutions of liberal
democracies, could claim the same role. According to Cottier (2002: 127),
trade and nontrade considerations are mutually compatible in the pursuit
of fuller coherence between the multilateral trading system and human
rights. In contrast, Howse (2002: 105) concludes that ‘a line of argument
that seeks to prevent the collapse of the trading system into politics really
ends up collapsing it into the complexly, but unmistakably political realm
of human rights discourse’. Some critical legal scholars have now provided
legal tools for mediating the tensions between developed and developing
countries and the relationship between domestic institutions and the goals
of the trading system (Howse and Nicolaidis, 2001: Picciotto, 2003). They
do not explore, however, the political economy that underpins the coexis-
tence of free trade and protectionism in the attempt to harmonise the global
trading order on a comprehensive basis.
On historical grounds there is nothing new in the assumption that pro-
tection and freedom of trade may coexist. Protectionism has mainly posited
temporal and sectoral limits amending the claim of free trade to be a general
and transhistorical principle. In many respects, this perspective is merely
a continuation of the classical mercantilist literature of the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries (Bairoch, 2001; Heilperin, 1963; Margerum
Harlen, 1999; Morini-Comby, 1930; Siroe¨n, 1992). Ever since Adam Smith,
conventional wisdom had been that mercantilism confused wealth with
money. However, mercantilist theories of the balance of trade abandoned
a definition of the value of exchange based on specie only since the late sev-
enteenth century. Not only did they relate monetary and commercial issues,
but also those of production and consumption.4 Neither was mercantilism
a doctrine directed towards the restraint of imports and promotion of ex-
ports solely in favour of the interests of chartered companies. As early as
the seventeenth century their monopolistic behaviour in trade prompted
fierce debate. A pamphlet of 1645 against the British Merchant Adventurers
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claimed for instance that ‘Trade is like Dung, which being closed kept in a
heap or two stinks, but being spread abroad it doth fertilise the earth and
make it more fructable’ (quoted in Magnusson, 1993: 102).
Perrotta (1988: ch. 4, 5, 7; 1991, 1997) offers a powerful explanation of the
peculiar juncture between freedom and protection of trade perceived by
most mercantilist authors. The theory of the positive balance of trade is not
a mere dyad between the control of markets overseas and protection of the
domestic market. The quest for a surplus balance of trade is grounded in
the value in use of the goods traded, not in specie or only exchange value.
Perrotta’s interpretation is founded upon the distinction that William Petty
made in the seventeenth century between productive and unproductive
labour: the definition of productive labour, to become a new standard of
value, partly hinges upon its capacity to create value beneficial to society,
i.e. use value. This implies that the criterion guiding state intervention in the
pursuit of a trade surplus is the productive potential considered socially
useful. At the beginning of industrial capitalism, this was realised through
restraints on the import of luxury goods, so as to encourage investment in
the education of skilled labour, access to cheap primary goods, to support
the growth of manufactures, and the export of manufactured goods.
The concept of transnational mercantilism seeks to apply the insights of
classical mercantilism to grasp a tension at the core of the new trade agenda.
It describes a situation where states hold themselves accountable for any
latent, possible, or effective impact of domestic regulations on the trading
system. It clarifies why the relationship between the transnationalisation of
capitalism and the economic and social role of political authority remains
problematic in matters of trade. The classical doctrine of the positive bal-
ance of trade was never only about trade. It pertained to the use of a balance
in fostering a particular type of society. Likewise, the concept of transna-
tional mercantilism takes into account the social value attributed to the
effect of trade, and consequently enables the critical investigation of trade
regulation in its impact upon society as a whole. It is from this perspec-
tive that the balance between market rules and state intervention in trade
regulation is a matter of ongoing social and political debates, ultimately
affecting the very legitimacy of states. Such an understanding of transna-
tional mercantilism provides a way to conceptualise the political economy
of global trade in parallel with three major claims of the heterodox tradi-
tion of global political economy: the differentiation between the political
and economic spheres, the functional articulation between domestic and
global realms, and the embeddedness of the economy in broader concerns
of society and civilisation.
First, in line with the argument of social theorists such as Braudel,
Polanyi, Gramsci and others, the concept of transnational mercantilism
highlights the contested role of political authority in the organisation of
material life. This central feature of capitalism and modern forms of state
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entails a differentiation between a sphere of economic activities governed
by market constraints and that of political action directed to the general
interest of society on a defined territorial space. Despite major theoreti-
cal and analytical disagreements, heterodox approaches on the conflictual
articulation of the political and economic spheres share a critical posture
which has led Cox (2002: 79) to point out that ‘the real achievement of IPE
was not to bring in economics, but to open up a critical investigation into
change in historical structures’. It is by assuming the reflective and trans-
formative aspect of knowledge and consciousness that a critical standpoint
appraises the defining boundary between the social relations involved in
the economic and political spheres as an object of contestation. As Rupert
(1995: 40) argues, the concrete shape of the relations between the economic
and political spheres is not given, but ‘socially produced and historically
mutable’.
Second, the concept of transnational mercantilism takes into account the
intimate connection between domestic and global realms. In the wake of
Marx’s ‘the world market is the bedrock of capitalism’, Braudel argued ‘the
modern state will have been one reality among many others in which cap-
italism has made its way, sometimes hindered, sometimes favoured. [But]
capitalism has always worn giants’ boots’ (Braudel, 1979: vol. 2, p. 494;
Marx, 1968: Book II, section 4, ch. XIII, p. 1101). As political mediations are
inherent in the economy, they inevitably have an impact on international
exchanges when a significant portion of the exchanged of goods and ser-
vices crosses borders. This impact takes contingent forms, which should
be assessed according to the historicity of struggles influencing the selec-
tive and differentiated interventions of the state. In this sense, by calling
attention to the pervading relations between domestic and trade politics,
the concept of transnational mercantilism tackles from a specific perspec-
tive what Palan describes as the central focus of heterodox IPE studies:
‘discontinuity between political and economic spaces is one of the major
sources of continuing change in international political economy’(1998: 68).
Finally, transnational mercantilism allows a broadening of the object of
trade policy. By placing on equal footing the quantifiable aspect of produc-
tive labour (exchange value) and its non-quantifiable standard of social util-
ity (use value), classical mercantilism emphasised the societal dimension
of selective and differentiated intervention of the state. This explains the
futility of trade-offs between free-trade and protectionism when the new
trade agenda deals with the harmonisation domestic regulations. More-
over, it provides a way to develop a framework of understanding beyond
the nexus of free-trade and protectionism, thus abolishing the conventional
distinction between commercial policy and political economy.
The argument presented here reflects increasing doubts as to the world-
wide consequences of neoliberal globalisation, as they become apparent in
the controversies over the differentiation of a comprehensive trading order
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on a world-wide scale. The concept of transnational mercantilism provides
a specific explanation why commercial regulation rests on two interrelated
criteria: the comprehensiveness of commitments relating to a wide range
of economic and social functions of the state, and the differentiation to be
established between market and non-market provisions. The remainder of
this article uses this framework to evaluate attempts to further harmonise
the global trading order.
DEFINING A COMPREHENSIVE AND DIFFERENTIATED
GLOBAL TRADING ORDER
The purpose here is to put the current debate on the WTO into the perspec-
tive of the comprehensive and differentiated concept of trade as developed
in the preceding theoretical section. This goes beyond an analysis of the
consequences of the Uruguay Round or a study of the WTO as an interna-
tional organisation (Jackson, 2000; Krueger, 1998; Trebilcock and Howse,
1999; Wilkinson, 2000). Rather, I try to assess the extent to which the new
round of negotiations launched at Doha on November 14, 2001, addresses
the deep concerns shared by numerous actors concerning the legitimacy
of the WTO in the aftermath of the ‘Battle of Seattle’.5 This requires a more
detailed examination of how the WTO frames trade policies predicated
not only upon the implementation of market mechanisms, but also on
the comprehensive scope of the varying embeddedness of trade into the
state-society complex, its relation to nature, and special and differential
treatment for developing countries. Among the delegations to the cur-
rent negotiations of the so-called Doha Development Agenda, few would
disagree with these broad goals. However, many disagree on the proper
balance to strike within this comprehensive agenda.
Market implementation
The key question regarding the implementation of market mechanisms in
the multilateral trading system is the extent to which reducing discrimina-
tory trade barriers should be reduced. There are four fundamental princi-
ples in support of a freer and non-discriminatory international trade policy.
The first is a commitment to enter into negotiations upon request to carry
out this general purpose. The second is a pledge towards the elimination
of quotas, which distort the operations of the price mechanism in a mar-
ket economy. The third is the unconditional ‘most-favoured-nation’ clause,
which calls for each member of a commercial treaty to grant one another the
most favourable treatment which they grant to any other trading partner.
Finally, the fourth and corollary obligation is ‘national treatment’, which
deals with the non-discriminatory treatment of imported goods once they
have cleared customs.
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All these clauses prevail in the legal framework of the WTO and they
have been implemented on a substantial scale during the GATT history.
As compared to 40 percent in the post-war era, average tariff on indus-
trial goods among industrial countries now stands at 4 percent, and more
than 40 percent of those goods are granted duty-free entry. Tariff bind-
ings cover not only industrial goods among industrial countries, but also
all agricultural goods and tariffs applied more and more in developing
and ‘transition’ economies. A great number of non-tariff restrictions have
been prohibited as well. Moreover, contrary to the results obtained after
the Tokyo Round, all members of the WTO are committed to the different
agreements attached to the results of the Uruguay Round. Finally, gradual
integration of developing countries toward MFN treatment is assured by
the Uruguay Round provisions. The traditional avenues of protectionist
policies still include, however, many hot issues, such as the 2002 American
decision to raise by 30 percent tariffs on steel imports or the long-standing
arrangements protecting the textile and clothing industries of the indus-
trialised countries.
As we have seen in the preceding section, deterritorialising the market-
incentive and socially protective functions of the state is a key feature of
transnational mercantilism. Hence, even if trade liberalisation proceeded
further, an economic policy cast so that the transnationalisation of the econ-
omy is presented as beneficial to all nationals still implies the involvement
of the state. The differentiated conditions of exchange stemming from such
measures stand at the core of controversies in domains such as export sub-
sidies, dumping, intellectual property, investment and competition, and
technical barriers to trade. Besides various disputes under review in the
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, the case of intellectual property is
probably the most contested issue linking market-incentive functions of the
state to the differentiated embeddedness of markets in the global trading
order.
The agreement on ‘trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights’
(TRIPs) adds to the WTO agenda one of the key issues related to what
the post-World War II planners were concerned about when dealing with
‘restrictive business practices’(Graz, 1999: 188–93). Private control over
patents was one of the main rationales for cartel arrangements in the
inter-war years. It is now one among numerous channels used by transna-
tional corporations to distort competition by restraining the diffusion of
knowledge and technology. In contrast with the conventions negotiated
under the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the TRIPs
agreement marks a breakthrough by requiring states to provide civil and
criminal procedures for the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Since it mainly benefits ‘those who own both the knowledge being coded
as property and the technology to exploit it’ (May, 1998: 75), this agree-
ment ties in only too well with state incentive functions related to the
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transnationalisation of capitalism. A sample case is provided by TRIPs ar-
ticle 27.3c that excludes patents on micro-organisms from the ban of patents
on life. The biggest multinational corporations in biotechnology and phar-
maceutical products are the key beneficiaries of such protection of prop-
erty rights by states. They played an important proactive role in pushing
the agenda into the Uruguay Round (Sell, 1999). In 2001, the outrage that
followed the failed AIDS lawsuit by 40 pharmaceutical firms against the
government of South Africa has brought back to the forefront the threat to
biodiversity and healthcare systems in the case of a full implementation
of the agreement (Wall Street Journal, 2001; World Trade Organization,
2001b). States like Brazil, India and South Africa, whose industries can
produce generics under compulsory licensing, are backed by those with-
out such facilities to redress the balance of proprietary rights in favour
of public health concerns. It remains unclear, however, how far the 2003
decision of the WTO on the implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha
‘Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health’ will provide a
more balanced interpretation of the relationship between private intellec-
tual property and public health policy. Yet, while only 5 percent of the
nearly six million people with AIDS in the developing world have access
to antiretroviral treatment, the proper use of compulsory licensing for do-
mestic and third party concerns remains a matter of harsh debate (Piot,
2003).
The embeddedness of trade in the state-society complex
The institutional framework of the WTO lies beyond a narrow definition
of a world market of goods and services. In many ways it deals with a
situation where states are accountable for the impact on the international
trading system of social relations engendered by the articulation between
the economic and political spheres. References to ‘raising standards of
living’ and ‘full employment’ are made in the very first paragraph of the
WTO preamble. However, instead of exceptions for effective interventions
related to such states’ socio-economic functions, the Uruguay Round did
not give much license to differentiated means to provide social protection.
The issue of employment and welfare has now come back to the forefront
of the WTO agenda. The impact that state-society relations have on trade
with regard to labour standards and services are among the most hotly
debated issues.
The debate over core labour standards refers to the social guarantees
given to labour as stipulated in seven ILO Conventions (29, 87, 98, 105,
100, 111, 138). These fundamental rights provide for freedom of associ-
ation and collective bargaining, prohibition of forced labour, prevention
of discrimination in employment, and a minimum age for employment.
Whereas organised labour and grass root organisations tied closely to
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most employer organisations and governments in rich countries to inte-
grate core labour standards into the WTO, in poor countries a number of
independent labour unions shared government’s views and corporate in-
terests in their strong hostility to any linkage between labour standards
and trade concerns. Labour standards were ruled out of the WTO agenda
at the 1996 Singapore meeting. Not only did the Final Declaration state
that the ILO was to be the sole ‘competent body to set and deal with
these standards’, it furthermore set aside the potential use of trade re-
strictions for their promotion by reaffirming that ‘economic growth and
development fostered by increased trade and further trade liberalisation
contribute to the promotion of these standards’. Despite the new ‘inte-
grated’ approach of the ILO to enhance its standards-related activities, the
firewall set between the two bodies has remained highly controversial.6
The SafeWork programme started in 1998–99, whose objective is to pre-
pare ILO Guidelines in the area of occupational health and safety (OHS),
has much to do with the failure of British Standards Institutions (BSI) to
introduce OHS standards within the International Organisation for Stan-
dardisation (ISO); this is not anecdotal, since the WTO agreement on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade recognises ISO-like international standards as po-
tentially legitimate measures notwithstanding their impact on trade.7 In
the near future, issues such as social labelling and the proposed ISO Cor-
porate Responsibility Management System Standard may well rekindle the
controversy.8
The disputed nature of trade in services has also gained momentum
since it has become clear that the scope of current negotiations increas-
ingly overlaps the traditional functions of public utilities. The Preamble of
the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) explicitly endorses
the differentiated embeddedness of the global market for services within
state-society relations: it recognises ‘the right of members to regulate, and
to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services within their territo-
ries [and] the particular need of developing countries to exercise this right’.
At the same time the GATS defines a framework for future market-oriented
negotiations by locking in ‘successive rounds of negotiations [. . . ] with a
view to achieving progressively a higher level of liberalisation’ (GATS, ar-
ticle XIX).9 The means by which the GATS should strike a balance between
further trade liberalisation and the regulatory rights of governments are
specified in article VI:4 which assigns the Council for Trade and Services
the largely market-inspired task to develop ‘any necessary discipline’ to
ensure that domestic regulations ‘do not constitute unnecessary barriers to
trade [and are] not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality
of the services’.
After significant steps made in 1997 on telecommunications and finan-
cial services, negotiations set in motion in February 2000 directly challenge
the flimsy frontier remaining between commercial services and public
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utilities. The request lists submitted to the WTO Secretariat leave out al-
most no public utilities or modes of supply. Documents prepared by the
European Commission reveal its intention to include, beside tourism and
transport, essential services such as water and energy.10 Prior to the ill-fated
Seattle Ministerial meeting in 1999, American demands added such items
as global market access to education and health (World Trade Organiza-
tion, 1999). Following the growing concerns of activists that government
policies towards public education and healthcare could be considered as
barriers to trade like subsidies or government support, the US requests
submitted in 2002 have slightly amended the list by withdrawing areas
such as water supply, public health and primary and secondary educa-
tion.11 While a small group of OECD countries are clearly the driving force
of negotiations pursuing the agenda of multinational service corporations
based in their countries, most LDCs and activists oppose a further expan-
sion of policies aimed at turning public services into private markets. The
Doha Declaration establishes that, contrary to the process endorsed in the
Uruguay Round, the conclusions of the negotiations on services would
be part of a single undertaking. Services will definitely be part of large
trade-offs regarding the level of their embeddedness into a market-based
environment.12
The embeddedness of trade within nature
The distinct framework necessary for the production and exchange of
goods closely embedded in natural constraints has always been a major so-
cial concern. Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the differentiated
framework for trade regulation in agriculture remains one of the most con-
troversial features of the WTO. Moreover, the issue of nature in its relation
to trade is now supplemented by broader environmental concerns.
Regarding agriculture, WTO members have recognised that ‘the long-
term objective of substantial, progressive reductions in support and pro-
tection, resulting in fundamental reform [in world agricultural trade] is
an ongoing process’ (art. 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture). Accord-
ing to the timeframe set for this part of the WTO agenda, negotiations
began in March 2000. Yet one might cast doubt on the capacity to ‘es-
tablish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system’ (art. 20.c)
without consideration of major social concerns. The Doha Ministerial Dec-
laration has recognised this tension by including mostly European and
Japanese claims to incorporate ‘non-trade concerns’ (WTO, 2000, 2001a,
para 13). Today aggregate agricultural support in the OECD countries
is equivalent to almost 60 percent of total world agricultural trade, an
amount which not only feeds transatlantic tensions, but also deeply chal-
lenges developing countries’ export markets, endangers the rural liveli-
hoods of local producers, and threatens their food security (UNCTAD,
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1999a). All these concerns were raised when President Bush signed in May
2002 the highly controversial Farm Bill worth $180 billions over 10 years
which will increase subsidies to American farmers by up to 70 percent.13
There is much misunderstanding, however, in the widely held claim that a
more market-based agriculture among OECD countries could be a trade-
off for missed export opportunities borne by LDC farmers. An undiffer-
entiated transnationalisation of world markets in agriculture would put
half a billion farmers of the South in direct competition with the Northern
hemisphere’s industrial agro-businesses, where productivity per farmer
may be up to 1000 times higher (Bessie`re, 2001; Mazoyer and Roudart,
2002). Moreover, since the productivist standards in agriculture have now
reached the border line of land and human physiological sustainability,
current negotiations on the degree to which states should respond to ‘non-
trade concerns’ could eventually mean significant advances on food safety
and quality factors, soil preservation, and animal welfare. Thus, although
the reform process called for in the current negotiations is strongly bi-
ased towards transnationalising agricultural markets, it could hardly ig-
nore the mercantilist claims regarding the use value aspect of agricultural
trade, be it for price stability, land preservation, or broader environmental
concerns.
Regarding the environment, WTO member states have until recently
subordinated the development of explicit measures to the view that the
preconditions for sustainable development lie in economic resources and
transfers of ‘clean’ technology facilitated by the freeing of trade and in-
vestment. The liberalisation of trade in environmental goods and services
adopted in paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Declaration follows this line
of argument. An increasing number of trade disputes refer, however, to
the environment.14 More generally, many environmental groups contest
on principle the ability of the market to provide a sufficient response to
environmental problems. They claim that trade policy is embedded in the
biosphere, which is finite and with constraining laws which the global
economy has to comply with. The decision-making bodies of the WTO
try hard to keep trade and the environment in watertight compartments.
But it remains unclear how the loose provisions of GATT art. XX chapeau,
b, g and the specific mandate of the Doha Declaration (31(i)) on ‘the re-
lationship between WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in
Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ will settle this controversial is-
sue. Other WTO provisions refer implicitly to environmental norms. The
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) refers to ISO-like inter-
national standards and specifies the use of technical governmental reg-
ulations in this domain (art. 2.4). The same exogenous logic prevails in
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) as regard




Thus, the WTO has so far declined to endogenise the relationship be-
tween trade and the natural environment (Damian and Graz, 2001). Dead-
lines for defining modalities of negotiation in agriculture have repeatedly
been missed. Regarding specific environmental issues, the Doha agenda
is limited to further liberalisation of environmental goods and services
and to the relationship between the WTO and Multilateral Environmental
Agreements. To settle trade disputes even loosely connected with nature,
the WTO relies on a range of exogenous institutions and standards. The
only jurisdiction of the WTO lies in giving a ruling on whether trade re-
strictions notified by states are scientifically based and legally consistent
with the WTO’s own regulatory framework (above all in terms of non-
discrimination and national treatment). Whereas transnational mercantil-
ism refers to the public sphere where states are accountable for the impact
of domestic regulations on the trading system, so far the definition of a le-
gitimate or illegitimate differentiation of the global trading order for ‘non
trade concerns’ in agriculture and broader environmental issues is, on the
contrary, left in the hands of a very small number of scientists and legal
experts.
Space and time
The differentiated needs of member-states according to their distinctive
integration in global capitalism concurred until recently mostly with trade
liberalisation: ‘open trade’ policies are conducive to growth. This conclu-
sion appears to hold regardless of the level of development of the countries
concerned’ read the 1998 WTO Annual Report (pp. 5–6) (see also Ben-David
et al., 2000). The carefully chosen words for the new Round of negotiations
launched in 2002 – the Doha Development Agenda – is in itself an expres-
sion of the shift that has taken place. More specifically, the Ministerial Dec-
laration agreed that ‘all special and differential treatment provisions shall
be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more
precise, effective and operational’ (WTO, 2001a: para 44). Moreover, by
adopting the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns,
it instructs the Committee on Trade and Development to consider more
broadly ‘how special and differential treatment may be incorporated into
the architecture of WTO rules’ (WTO, 2001c: para 12iii). Continued dis-
agreement on the proper weight to be given to that mandate has impaired
the special sessions on special and differential treatment since their cre-
ation in February 2002. After several missed deadlines, the credibility of
the WTO is now closely related to its capacity to address on a satisfactory
basis the spatio-temporal differentiation of global capitalism (Kwa, 2002;
Stephens, 2003).
The implementation concerns related to the Uruguay Round Agreement
have become crucial for most LDCs. WTO rules remain deeply unbalanced
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in several important development-related areas such as the protection of in-
tellectual property rights, the use of industrial subsidies and anti-dumping
measures by developed countries in specific sectors of export interest to
LDCs, or the new disciplines imposed on the use of certain trade-related
investment measures (OXFAM, 2002). Agricultural exports from develop-
ing countries remain greatly hampered by massive domestic support and
export subsidies in developed countries, whereas the discipline imposed
on developing countries raises increasing concerns. Whereas the Agree-
ment on Textiles and Clothing was heralded as a major achievement for
the LDCs in committing the developed countries to lift all quotas on im-
ports and other discriminatory instruments of the Multifiber Agreement
(MFA) by January 1, 2005, the difficulties encountered in the implementa-
tion process have now led to the widely held belief that, while the MFA
may disappear, it may well be replaced by a series of other trade instru-
ments, and possibly substantial increases in anti-dumping duties. In the
field of services, the breakthrough made in GATS by including the move-
ment of natural persons as one of the four modes of supply in exchanging
services also remains lopsided; LDCs have little chance to include in this
item workers other than those active in professional services provided by
the big multinational accountancy firms, consultant groups, insurance or
financial companies.
In terms of market access, even with a full implementation of the
Uruguay Round, the average tariff on imports from LDCs would still be
10 percent higher than the average tariff on imports from other developed
countries. It is the sectors specifically involved in the path of technologi-
cal upgrading and structural transformation of developing economies that
face the highest average tariffs, tariff peaks, tariff escalation and non-tariff
barriers when exported to northern markets (UNCTAD, 1999b: 134–46).
According to Rubens Ricupero, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, this ‘pro-
vides sufficient grounds to retain the infant-industry concept as an integral
part of trade policy discussion’ (UNCTAD, 1999b: x).
The distributional issue related to free trade is the reason why the
transnational drive embodied by the WTO framework raises concerns for
the vast majority of the world’s population. Besides the implementation
of the Uruguay Round, market reforms forced upon developing countries
in the aftermath of the first debt crisis and the succession of financial crises
that have plagued the 1990s have led towards increasing distrust. This,
in turn, has prompted more organised struggles against policies pursuing
the transnationalisation of the economy. The victories of leftwing presi-
dents in Brazil and Equador in 2002 and the resistance to destabilisation in
Venezuela are sometimes portrayed as a Latin American model for weak-
ening neoliberal hegemony across the developing world (Ramonet, 2003).
It is within this broader picture that the ongoing negotiations on the ex-
tent of ‘special and differential treatment’ reflect the difficulty for the WTO
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to face the demands for a better differentiated regulatory framework in
which the space and time constraints of global capitalism are duly taken
into consideration.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has explored the problems encountered by the WTO in the shift
from a trade agenda focused on tariff reduction to the harmonisation of
domestic regulations in consequence of their impact on international ex-
changes. It suggests that the WTO, as the core forum of the global trading
order, is now facing a fundamental crisis because of its failure to strike
an acceptable balance between market and non-market provisions on a
comprehensive scope and world-wide basis. Although the mandate of the
so-called ‘Doha Development Agenda’ includes provisions giving a more
balanced interpretation of the embeddedness of international trade in non-
trade concerns, it remains unclear whether this slight revision should be
seen as anything more than a pragmatic response to the tensions between
developed and developing countries, and growing domestic concerns re-
garding the goals of the multilateral trading system. A number of implica-
tions arise from this analysis.
First, the theoretical framework contrasts with the conventional anal-
yses of the so-called ‘new trade agenda’. Most scholars are concerned
with the harmonisation of an ever-increasing range of domestic policies
considered to have an impact on trade and the compatibility of these
policies with major non-trade concerns such as human rights or the en-
vironment. This paper has focused, on the contrary, on the contradic-
tory nature of the global trading order and this impacts on the WTO.
The concept of transnational mercantilism makes explicit the problem-
atic relationship between the transnationalisation of capitalism and the
economic and social roles of political authorities within a defined space.
It is clear that within classical mercantilist thinking the mediations shap-
ing the specific configurations between the economic and political realms
of trade policy remain elusive. Put bluntly, Marx may have been wrong
in accusing mercantilists of succumbing to the fetishism of commodi-
ties, since use value was one of their key concerns; he was right, how-
ever, to consider that the criteria for determining use value did not take
into account the social relations of production in a capitalist environ-
ment.15 Yet, mercantilist thinking allows us to reconceptualise the politics
of trade by reference to three major claims: the articulation between the
economic and political spheres, the intimate connection between domestic
and international realms, and the embeddedness of trade policy within
broader political economy concerns. The concrete manifestations of these
categories and their relations are not given but socially and historically
produced.
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Second, notwithstanding the challenges of American unilateralism, re-
gionalism, and a lack of clear relationship between the WTO and compet-
ing multilateral organisations, the conceptual framework of transnational
mercantilism provides a means to situate the current problems of the WTO
within the broader perspective of a global trading order which must cope
with two interrelated challenges: the comprehensiveness of commitments re-
lating to a wide range of economic and social functions of the state, and the
differentiation between market and non-market provisions. The argument
has provided evidence of an ever-increasing scope of the WTO consistent
with the transnationalising processes of capitalism that subsume new as-
pects of domestic policies which can have an impact on trade. In acknowl-
edging the level of differentiation claimed by states on behalf of various
and often opposing configurations of social forces, the paper suggests that
the road towards transnationalisation is hindered by mercantilist practices,
which differentiate the use value embodied by the exchanged goods. What
is trade impacts not only on the fulfilment of a freer non-discriminatory
trade, but also on the embeddedness of trade in state–society relations, in
the natural environment and in the spatio-temporal structures of capital-
ism. The current concerns regarding the capacity of the WTO to fulfil the
mandate agreed in Doha hinge on the impossibility of reaching a broad
international understanding regarding the acceptable scope and priority
to give these imperatives.
Finally, the significance of transnational mercantilism also reaches be-
yond the intergovernmental environment of the WTO and the public
sphere of its engagement with global social movements. Whilst this pa-
per has examined the shortcomings of the various attempts of the mul-
tilateral trading system to offer a credible response in terms of fair and
sustainable trade, it does not address how the devolution of authority to
non-state actors can be seen as another issue of major significance for the
future of the multilateral trading system. When an average of two-thirds
of world trade is related to intra-firm trade and extensive networks of
inter-firm alliances are set up by various forms of cross-holdings, even the
business-oriented The Economist can worry that ‘private barriers to trade
might replace those put up by the State’.16 In addition to the hierarchy
of the market in intra-firm trade, private authority in international trade
regulation also arises from the devolution of authority made possible by
the WTO rules, in particular in health, safety and environmental matters.
For instance, following the second triennial review of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, international voluntary standards set by hy-
brid bodies like the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)
or private companies like the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) can become authoritative sources for the purposes of the WTO
mechanism in the settlement of disputes. This epitomises the shift in the
balance between private and public authority as the regulatory scope of
612
GRAZ: TRANSNATIONAL MERCANTILISM
private actors expands. It clearly demonstrates, however, that the quest to
rebuild a consensus around the WTO, as the core of the multilateral trad-
ing system, also rests on forces from both ends of the political spectrum
and outside the intergovernmental environment. Both global social move-
ments and private arrangements are transcending the framework of the
WTO. Both have competing alternative agendas promoting more radical
shifts in the global trading order.
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NOTES
1 Works which discuss the new trade agenda include: Ostry (1997, 2000), Cable
(1996), Feteketuky (1992), Sauve´ and Zampetti (2000), Birdsall and Lawrence
(1999). For one of the first study in this perspective, see Blackhurst (1981).
2 For historiographical reviews on mercantilism, see Magnusson (1994, 1993)
and Perrotta (1988). The classics of the 1930s were Heckscher (1955) and Viner
(1937). For the classics of the next generation of commentators, see Coleman
(1969). For a massive collection of primary sources, see Magnusson (1995).
3 For various contributions to the heterodox tradition in global political economy,
see for instance the following edited volumes: Higgott and Payne (2000); Palan
(2000).
4 See note 2 above.
5 For analyses on the issue of legitimacy in the aftermath of Seattle, see Howse
(2001), McGillivray (2000), Sampson (2001), Schott (2000), Wilkinson (2001).
6 See in particular Hugues and Wilkinson (2000); for background, see Charnovitz
(1987).
7 For background, see SafeWork, Development of ILO Guidelines on Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Management Systems (OSH-MS). Informa-
tion Note (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2001), online:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safework/managmnt/inote.
htm 〈acceded 3 November 2001〉.
8 The decision to develop an International Standard providing guidelines for
social responsibility was taken by Resolution 35/2004 of the Technical Man-
agement Board of the International Organization for Standardization, 24–25
June 2004. For further analysis, see Graz (2004).
9 The coverage of MFN for each GATS member is determined by a so-called
negative list – it applies to all services except those listed in the Annex of
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the agreement. The sectoral coverage of national treatment is determined by
a positive list – it only applies to sectors listed in a member’s schedule of
commitments. For background on GATS, see Sauve´ and Stern (2000).
10 The European draft requests lists to 28 other WTO member states were
published on the following website: http://www.gatswatch.org/requests-
offers.html, 〈acceded 15 April 2003〉.
11 For the executive summary of the US requests, see: http://www.ustr.gov/
sectors/services/2002-07-01-proposal-execsumm.PDF 〈acceded 15 July 2002〉.
12 For the critique of the GATS, see, for instance, Barlow (2001) and the
GATSWatch website: http://www.xs4all.nl/∼ceo/gatswatch/. For the posi-
tion of the Secretariat, see More (2001) and WTO (2001e).
13 The Guardian, May 18, 2002.
14 In the period 1980-1990, notifications on environmental grounds represented
7.8 percent of all notifications of technical barriers to trade; in 1998 the figure
was 15 percent, 12.5 percent in 1999, and 15.6 percent in 2000 (WTO, 2001d).
15 See in particular The Capital, Book II, section 4, chap. XIII (Marx, 1968, 1104-5);
see also Perrotta (1988, 126).
16 The Economist: A Survey of World Trade, October 3rd 1998, 14.
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